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We derive median-voter results and study the shape of redistributional taxes when voters elect 
a candidate who imposes taxes to maximize own utility. Under general conditions, a median-
productivity candidate is a Condorcet winner. The imposed tax function is nonlinear, may 
place high marginal rates on very low incomes, and may have an interval of negative marginal 
rates below the income of the winning candidate. Marginal rates are positive throughout, 
however, if non-redistributional spending or altruism toward the poor are great enough. 
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 INTRODUCTION
Ad i ﬃculty in understanding how democratic forces shape tax and transfer
policies is that such policies are inherently nonlinear, which causes cycling in models
of direct voting over policy.1 Voting cycles can sometimes be eliminated by restricting
policy to linear tax functions, but this approach obviously precludes study of nonlin-
earities.2 To study redistributional tax policies under majority rule without imposing
linearity, we assume instead that policy is determined in a stylized representative
democracy in which voters elect one of two candidates. The winning candidate is
not bound by campaign promises and, once in oﬃce, implements his or her own most
preferred tax function.3
A key assumption is that individuals diﬀer only in productivity. This helps
eliminate cycles because elections are between individuals, who are ranked along
the single dimension of productivity, and not between policy functions, which are
inﬁnite-dimensional. As in Mirrlees (1971), policy is required only to satisfy incentive-
compatibility and budget constraints.
Röell (1996) provided a median-voter result for the special case in which utility
is quasi-linear (no income eﬀects) and a minimum-utility constraint does not bind
(no individual has zero consumption). She stated that “whether [a median-voter
result] obtains in a fully general setting with quasi-linear preferences remains an open
question” (p.12). We prove a median-voter result under a general utility function,
whether or not a minimum-utility constraint binds.
1For instance, in an electorate of three voters with diﬀerent incomes, any redistributional tax
policy can be upset by an alternative policy that would eﬀectively take resources from one of the
voters and give the resources to the other two.
2Examples of the approach are in Romer (1975), Roberts (1979), and Meltzer and Richard (1981).
3In an important unpublished paper, Röell (1996) used the same approach to study nonlinear
taxation. Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997) also consider a setting in which
an election winner sets policy to maximize own utility.
1To understand the result, consider an election between two candidates with
diﬀerent productivities. If elected, each would maximize own utility by choosing a tax
function with a low (possibly negative) tax at the own optimal income, and possibly
higher taxes at other incomes.4 Under regularity conditions described below, there is a
crossover point between the two candidates’ productivities such that individuals with
productivity above the crossover vote for the candidate with greater productivity
and individuals with productivity below the crossover vote for the candidate with
lower productivity. This property implies that the candidate who receives the votes
of median-productivity voters wins under majority rule. It follows that a candidate
with median productivity is a Condorcet winner, meaning a candidate that beats any
other candidate with a diﬀerent productivity.
We also describe the tax function an election winner imposes. To extract taxes
from individuals with higher productivities, the tax function is strictly increasing
above the winner’s income. To extract taxes from individuals with lower productiv-
ities, the function may impose greater taxes than the winner pays at incomes just
below the winner’s, that is, marginal rates may be negative just below the winner’s
income. Such an outcome seems counterfactual. We show that the tax function can
have positive marginal rates at all incomes if government funds non-redistributional
spending or if individuals are altruistic.
An empirical observation is that the phase-out of welfare subsidies often leads
to high eﬀective marginal tax rates at the low end of the income distribution.5 An
outcome with relatively high marginal rates at low incomes can easily result from two
forces in the model here: the winner wishes to extract taxes from individuals with
lower productivities, but cannot squeeze positive taxes from individuals with zero
4We use taxes to mean net taxes, that is total taxes paid to government minus total transfers
received from government.
5See Browning and Johnson (1979), Dickert et al. (1995), Keane and Moﬃtt (1998).
2income so the tax function’s intercept cannot be positive. As a consequence, the tax
function may increase steeply just above zero income and then becomes ﬂatter (and
p o s s i b l ys l o p ed o w n w a r d )a si n c o m er i s e st o w a r dt h ew i n n e r ’ si n c o m e .
The winner’s tax function is always nonlinear with a kink at the winner’s
own income, and is strictly better than a linear tax for the winner. Thus there is
an interval of individuals close to the election winner in productivity who also are
better oﬀ than they would be under a linear tax. This together with the median-voter
results provides a sense in which the analysis accords with Director’s Law: if one of
the candidates has close to median productivity, the resulting policy is better than a
linear tax for middle-productivity individuals.6
Section I describes the model. Section II uses a numerical example to provide
intuition and guide the formal analysis. In section III, we derive the policy a winning
candidate would impose, characterizing the candidate’s own optimal income level and
the resulting utility levels of all individuals in the electorate. In section IV, we study
election outcomes and provide median-voter results. In section V, we build on the
derivation of the winner’s optimal policy to characterize the shape of the tax function.
Section VI concludes.
I. MODEL
Tax-paying units (“individuals”) diﬀer only in productivity (x); we therefore
refer to an individual with productivity x as simply “individual x.” Productivity has
distribution function F(x) with continuous density f and ﬁnite mean over support
[x−,x +] with x+ >x − ≥ 0; x+ may be inﬁnite. We assume f>0 over (x−,x +).
6See Stigler (1970), who argued that the middle classes sometimes have relatively great political
clout and also beneﬁt disproportionately from many government spending programs. Recent analyses
of spending programs consistent with Director’s Law are in Gouveia (1997) and Dixit and Londregan
(1998).
3Below, “all x” means “all x ∈ [x−,x +].”
Each individual has the same strictly increasing, diﬀerentiable, weakly concave
utility u deﬁned over consumption c ≥ 0 and leisure 0 ≤ l ≤ 1. Each maximizes utility
by choosing how much to labor to supply, n ≡ 1 − l, which determines gross income,
y ≡ nx, and hence consumption, c ≡ y − T,w h e r eT is the positive or negative tax
the individual pays. To ensure that labor supply is always strictly less than one, we
assume liml−>0 ul(c,l)/uc(c,l)=∞ for any c>0, where subscripts denote partial
derivatives throughout.
Before making labor-leisure choices, the individuals elect one of two exoge-
nously given candidates by majority rule. We model government policy as set by
the election winner, denoted xe. Because cycling results from direct voting over tax
functions, we assume that candidates cannot commit to set speciﬁct a xf u n c t i o n si f
elected. The winning candidate therefore designs policy to maximize own utility.
This stylized representative democracy abstracts from several aspects of polit-
ical life. Notably, we allow candidates to be two arbitrary individuals in [x−,x +] to
prove median-voter results, but we do not study the politics of how the candidates
are selected. Also, we do not study how policy is set by governments drawn from
more than one (possibly overlapping) jurisdiction.7
Candidates’ productivities and hence the policies they would impose are re-
vealed to voters during the electoral process, so each voter knows the utility he/she
would receive if either candidate were elected. Each individual votes for the candidate
who would provide greater utility.
There are three limits on the power to tax. First and as in Mirrlees (1971),
government can observe individuals’ incomes but not their productivities; hence it
7Given the assumption that individuals diﬀer only in productivity, allowing for many jurisdictions
should matter little: if candidate productivities are the same across jurisdictions, all election winners
would wish to impose the same tax function.
4imposes a tax function T∗ that speciﬁes the positive or negative net tax paid by an
individual as a function of the individual’s gross income y.( D i ﬀerent election winners
xe would impose diﬀerent T∗’s, but we suppress this dependence when studying the
taxes imposed by a generic winner.) Second and as in Meltzer and Richard (1981), xe
is subject to the same rules as other individuals and must pay taxes according to T∗.
Third and as in Röell, an individual cannot be forced to work in order to pay taxes.
Thus xe’s policy can give no individual utility lower than that of a non-worker with
zero taxes, or U(x) ≥ u(0,1) for all x, where U(x) is the utility individual x obtains
under the tax function chosen by xe.8 The latter implies that an individual’s taxes
cannot exceed the individual’s income.
A non-altruistic election winner with moderate or high productivity may im-
pose a tax function that extracts substantial revenue from low-productivity individ-
uals, leaving them with utility close or equal to u(0,1). Such an outcome is hard to
square with observed welfare payments to low-income individuals. To allow for altru-
ism and see how it aﬀects the tax function, we assume the election winner guarantees
a minimum consumption level α ≥ 0 and hence a minimum utility level u(α,1) to all
citizens; this altruism is Rawlsian (1971) in that it reﬂects concern with those who
are worst oﬀ. Both the possibility of altruism and the requirement that utility be
bounded below by u(0,1) are captured by imposing the minimum-utility constraint
U(x) ≥ u(α,1), for all x, where u(α,1) > −∞. (1)
This treats α as a preference parameter common to all candidates.9
8Such a constraint would be superﬂuous in Mirrlees (1971) and Meltzer-Richard (1981), where
the optimal or equilibrium policy is to transfer to low-productivity individuals.
9If u is unbounded and α =0 ,t h e nu(α,1) = −∞ is possible, violating the assumption u(α,1) >
−∞. I ns u c hc a s e sw er e d e ﬁne c to be consumption ﬁnanced from taxed income, and assume
that individuals also obtain a ﬁxed positive amount of consumption from home production. These
assumptions make u(0,1) ﬁnite and the analysis below goes through with the redeﬁned variable c.
5The election winner’s choice of a tax function is subject to a government
budget constraint
R x+
x− T∗(Y (x))dF(x) ≥ G, where G ≥ 0 is an exogenous level of
non-redistributional spending and Y is an individual’s income when the tax function
is T∗.W ea s s u m et a xf u n c t i o n sT∗ e x i s tt h a ts t r i c t l ys a t i s f yt h eg o v e r n m e n tb u d g e t .
Speciﬁcally, we assume that α and G satisfy G< ˆ G(α),w h e r e ˆ G(α) is the supremum
of levels of G that can be ﬁnanced given tax functions that satisfy (1) for given α.
Because α and G are given parameters, we suppress dependence of the problem on
them when no ambiguity arises. In section V, we study how changes in α and G aﬀect
the shape of T∗.
Following Mirrlees (1971) and Seade (1982), we make the agent monotonicity
assumption that nul(c,1 − n)/uc(c,1 − n) is strictly increasing in n for all c>0.
This will ensure that an individual with greater productivity never ﬁnds it optimal
to earn less income than an individual with lower productivity. Suﬃcient conditions
for agent monotonicity are that consumption is normal or that utility is separable.
The tax function T∗ chosen by xe induces proﬁles of utility {U(x)}x and income
{Y (x)}x for all individuals. To characterize T∗, we follow Mirrlees (1971, 1986) by
reformulating xe’s utility maximization as a control problem. Speciﬁcally, the problem
of choosing T∗ is equivalent to the problem of choosing a utility proﬁle {U(x)}x and an
income proﬁle {Y (x)}x subject to incentive-compatibility constraints requiring that
any individual x be induced to work n(x)=Y (x)/x in order to earn the assigned
income Y (x).
To express the incentive-compatibility constraints as functions of the proﬁles
{U(x)}x and {Y (x)}x, denote the consumption level that provides utility U at work
eﬀort n by c∗(U,n); this function is deﬁned by the identity U = u(c∗,1−n). Incentive-
compatibility then requires
U(x) ≥ u(c
∗(U(z),Y(z)/z),1 − Y (z)/x), for all x and z satisfying x ≥ Y (z), (2)
6which says that income and utility proﬁles must be such that an individual with true
productivity x does not prefer the income-and-tax package of any other individual
(z) to his own. The constraints apply only for x ≥ Y (z) because individual x cannot
earn an income Y (z) >xwithin the time constraint n ≤ 1.
From Mirrlees (1971, 1986), the incentive-compatibility constraints (2) are





where ω(U,Y,z) ≡ ul(c
∗(U(z),Y(z)/z),1 − Y (z)/z) · Y (z)/z
2,
plus requirements that Y (x) be monotone non-decreasing and Y (x) <x . 10 We there-
fore replace (2) by (3), deﬁne the income derivative ψ(x) ≡ dY/dx, and ensure mono-
tonicity by imposing11
ψ(x) ≥ 0, for all x. (4)
Our assumption that liml−>0 ul(c,l)/uc(c,l)=∞ for any c>0 ensures Y (x) <x .
To express the government budget constraint in terms of the proﬁles {U(x)}x
and {Y (x)}x, let
T(U,Y,x) ≡ Y − c
∗(U,Y/x) (5)
denote the revenue that is extracted from an individual with utility U and income Y
who has productivity x. The government budget constraint is then
Z x+
x−
T(U(x),Y(x),x)dF(x) ≥ G. (6)
10Speciﬁcally, theorem 1 in Mirrlees (1971) shows that (2) implies a non-decreasing income proﬁle
and Y (x) <x . Lemma 6.1 in Mirrlees (1986) proves that (2) implies (3) for a lower bound of 0
instead of x−; taking the diﬀerence U(x)−U(x−) yields (3) for any x− ≥ 0. That (3) implies (2) is
a special case of Mirrlees (1986) lemma 6.3, as discussed in Mirrlees (1986, p. 1237).
11That is, we follow Brito and Oakland (1977) and Ebert (1992) in using a “second-order” ap-
proach. We assume that ψ(x) is piecewise continuous, so dY(x)/dx may be undeﬁned at a ﬁnite
number of points.
7Thus xe’s problem is to maximize U(xe) subject to (1), (3), (4), and (6) by choice of
{U(x),Y(x),ψ(x)}x. The solution to xe’s problem is a proﬁle {U(x),Y(x),ψ(x)}x.
II. AN EXAMPLE
This section presents a numerical example that illustrates the model’s main
features and results. The example follows Diamond’s (1998) simpliﬁcation of Mirrlees
(1971) in assuming aﬃne utility with a constant elasticity of labor supply: u(c,l)=
c + v0{1 − (1 − l)1+v1}/(1 + v1),w h e r ev0 is a constant and v1 is the wage elasticity
of labor supply. In the example, we take v0 =5 , v1 =1 , and assume that F(x) is
uniform on [x−,x +]=[ .2,1.8].12 Denote the median productivity xM; the assumed
distribution has xM =1 . We assume initially that G =0and α =0 .
Consider an election between xM a n da na l t e r n a t i v ec a n d i d a t exA = .84, at
the 40th percentile. Figure 1 shows the tax functions xM and xA would set if elected.
Because G =0and the government budget binds, some individuals gain net income
(T<0) and others lose net income (T>0) from either function.
As in the ﬁgure, either candidate if elected would impose a negative tax on
him/herself and would transfer resources from others by imposing a V-shaped tax
function with a minimum at the candidate’s own utility-maximizing income, generi-
cally denoted ye. The steepness of the V balances two forces. A steeper V tends to
extract greater resources from others by raising the taxes they pay, decreasing the
tax the winner pays. But because the winner’s own income level is tax-favored and
taxes are based on income and not productivity, other individuals have an incentive
to change their labor supplies to earn the tax-favored income ye.T h u sas t e e p e rV
also expands the set of individuals who earn ye, raising the tax the winner pays.
An individual’s incentive to earn the tax-favored income ye decreases with
12Although aﬃne utility violates the assumption liml−>0 ul(c,l)/uc(c,l)=∞,t h ep a r a m e t e r
values we choose ensure that leisure is bounded away from zero so Y (x) <x .
8the diﬀerence between the individual’s productivity and xe.S p e c i ﬁcally, there is an
interval around xe, generically denoted [x1,x 2] below, such that xe’s optimal policy
induces all individuals in [x1,x 2] to earn ye. This bunching of incomes gives a mass-
point in the income distribution at ye and causes the proﬁle of taxes set by any
candidate to be ﬂat on [x1,x 2].T h e[x1,x 2]-intervals for xM and xA are illustrated in
ﬁgure 2; interval endpoints are slightly higher for xM than for xA.
The minimum-utility constraint (1) limits government’s ability to extract taxes
from individuals with low market incomes. This explains why the two tax functions
rise from the origin, peak, and then fall at incomes below ye.
Figure 3 shows the utility proﬁles induced by xM and xA. The proﬁles cross at
x ∼ = 0.926: individuals x & .926 receive greater utility if xM is elected; and individuals
x . .926 receive greater utility if xA is elected, except that individuals with minimum
productivity x = .2 receive utility u(0,1) from both candidates. Thus all individuals
with greater-than-median productivity (half the population) plus some individuals
with lower-than-median productivity would vote for xM,s oxM would win against
xA. Analogously, xM would win against any other candidate.
The tax functions in ﬁgure 1 are notably nonlinear. For instance, xM’s func-
tion gives xM a large negative tax and imposes positive taxes on lower-productivity
individuals. This would not happen if taxes were constrained to be linear (ﬁgure 4),
because xM would then have to give large negative taxes to low-productivity individ-
uals in order to obtain a small negative tax him/herself.13
Figure 5 illustrates how government spending G aﬀects xM’s tax function. If
G =0 , individuals with incomes near Y (xM) receive negative taxes while individuals
with income near Y (x−) pay taxes, giving the tax function a negatively sloped seg-
ment below the winner’s income. As G rises from zero toward ˆ G (about 0.0772 in
13If taxes are constrained to be linear, our model yields the same tax function as Meltzer and
Richard (1981), so ﬁgure 4 provides a comparison of our model and Meltzer-Richard’s.
9the example), the election winner must increase taxes on middle and upper income
individuals because the minimum utility constraint rules out increased taxes on indi-
viduals with low productivity. This tilts the V-shaped spike so the negatively sloped
segment vanishes. As long as G< ˆ G, however, the equilibrium tax function always
has a kink at ye. Thus taxes are always nonlinear but may increase monotonically
with income.
Figure 6 illustrates how the altruistic consumption ﬂoor α aﬀects the tax
function. An increase in α has two eﬀects. First, it lowers the intercept of the
function (which is −α), pulling the function down at low incomes. Second, it raises
the government’s need for revenue, pulling the function up at higher incomes. Both
eﬀects tend to make the tax function slope upward and may make taxes increase
monotonically with income.
III. AN ELECTION WINNER’S POLICY
The ﬁr s ts t e pi nag e n e r a la n a l y s i si st os o l v exe’s problem, deriving the winning
candidate’s optimal own income ye and tax function T∗. A complication is that xe’s
objective U(xe) is also a point on the utility proﬁle and hence enters a subset of the
incentive-compatibility constraints. We deal with this by solving a modiﬁed version
of xe’s problem with analytically convenient properties that will turn out to have the
same solution as the original problem.
In the modiﬁed problem, we give xe the additional option of choosing a sep-
arate own income ye and tax payment Te (and hence an own consumption ye − Te),
but we subject xe to additional incentive compatibility constraints requiring that no
individual x capable of earning ye (that is, with x ≥ ye) would receive greater utility
from earning ye and paying taxes Te than from accepting the assigned utility U(x).
10These additional constraints are
U(x) ≥ Ue(x) for x ≥ ye, (7)
where Ue(x) ≡ u(ye −Te,1−ye/x) is the utility x would receive from earning ye and
paying taxes Te. Formally, xe’sm o d i ﬁed problem is to
maximize u(ye − Te,1 − ye/xe)
subject to (1), (3), (4), (6), and (7),
by choice of (ye,T e,{U(x),Y(x),ψ(x)}x).
The modiﬁed problem can be solved conveniently in two stages. The ﬁrst stage
is a control problem that determines the set of feasible (ye,T e) pairs, and the second
is a simple utility maximization that determines the optimal (ye,T e) pair. To evaluate
whether a pair (ye,T e) is feasible, we ﬁnd the maximum revenue R(ye,T e) that can be






subject to (1), (3), (4), and (7),
by choice of {U(x),Y(x),ψ(x)}x. Ap a i r(ye,T e) is feasible if and only if R(ye,T e) ≥ G.
Because the value of xe does not enter the objective function or the constraint
set of CRM, the set of feasible (ye,T e) pairs is the same for all potential election
winners. This feature is indispensable in deriving voting theorems in the next section.
The conditioning variables ye and Te enter CRM only through Ue(x) in the
inequality constraint (7), and the form of the solution diﬀers depending on whether
(7) binds. To determine the (ye,T e) pairs for which (7) binds, we solve CRM without






subject to (1), (3), and (4),
by choice of {U(x),Y(x),ψ(x)}x. We assume URM has a unique solution denoted
{ˆ U(x), ˆ Y (x), ˆ ψ(x)}x. Note that the maximum revenue that can be raised under URM
is ˆ G.
For (ye,T e) pairs with low enough Ue(x) so ˆ U(x) ≥ Ue(x) for all x ≥ ye,t h e
proﬁle {ˆ U(x)}x satisﬁes (7); thus for such pairs, the solution to URM also solves
CRM. (Because G< ˆ G,a l l(ye,T e) pairs for which {ˆ U(x)}x satisﬁes (7) are feasible.)
For all other (ye,T e) pairs, ˆ U(x) <U e(x) for at least one x ≥ ye, so {ˆ U(x)}x
violates (7). Solutions to URM and CRM therefore diﬀer and (7) binds at some
value(s) of x under a solution to CRM. Given a conditioning pair (ye,T e), (7) therefore
binds if and only if ˆ U(x) <U e(x) for at least one x. Let B ≡ {(ye,T e) | ˆ U(x) <U e(x)
for some x ≥ ye} denote the set of (ye,T e) pairs for which (7) binds so the solution to
URM does not solve CRM. Also let ¯ B = {(ye,T e) | ˆ U(x) ≤ Ue(x), for some x ≥ ye}
denote the closure of B.
For any (ye,T e) ∈ B,l e txb denote a value of x at which (7) binds so U(xb)=
Ue(xb). We show below that for any such xb, CRM can be solved in two parts: choose
{U(x),Y(x),ψ(x)}x for x ≤ xb to maximize revenue obtained from individuals with
productivities less than xb; and choose {U(x),Y(x),ψ(x)}x for x ≥ xb to maximize
revenue obtained from individuals with productivities greater than xb.14
For given (xb,y e,T e), problem CRM1 focuses on maximizing revenue ob-
14Constraint (7) turns out to hold with equality at xe, but imposing xb = xe would obscure the
independence of the set of feasible (ye,T e) pairs on the winner’s identity.





subject to (1), (3), (4),U(xb)=Ue(xb), and Y (xb) ≤ ye,
by choice of {U(x),Y(x),ψ(x)}x≤xb. Similarly, problem CRM2 focuses on maxi-





s u b j e c tt o( 1 ) ,( 3 ) ,( 4 ) ,U(xb)=Ue(xb), and Y (xb) ≥ ye,
by choice of {U(x),Y(x),ψ(x)}x≥xb. The condition U(xb)=Ue(xb) imposed on
both problems ensures that (7) holds with equality at xb.L e t R1(xb,y e,T e) and
R2(xb,y e,T e) denote maximal values of the revenue integrals in CRM1 and CRM2.
Problems URM, CRM1, and CRM2 have the same objective function and dif-
ferential equations. They diﬀer only in domains and boundary conditions. Hence their
Hamiltonians and Euler equations have the same form. The common Hamiltonian is
H(U,Y,ψ,ξ,µ,x)=T(U,Y,x) · f(x)+ω(U,Y,x) · ξ(x)+ψ(x) · µ(x),
where ξ and µ as the costate variables associated with U and Y. The implied Euler
equations are
HY = TY · f(x)+ωY(U,Y,x) · ξ(x)=−µx(x),( 8 )
HU = TU · f(x)+ωU(U,Y,x) · ξ(x)=−ξx(x),( 9 )
where deﬁnition of T and the properties of c∗ imply TY =1− ul/(ucx) and TU =
−1/uc.
13We sidestep issues of existence and uniqueness of a solution to CRM with:15
Assumption CON: For all (ye,T e) ∈ ¯ B and xb ∈ {x | ˆ U(x) ≤ Ue(x)},C R M 1
and CRM2 each have a solution. For any solution, functions ξ and µ satisfying (8) and
(9) exist, and H(U,Y,ψ,ξ,µ,x) is strictly concave in (U,Y ) for all x. The functions U
and Y are continuous in x, ψ is piecewise continuous in x,a n dξ and µ are continuous
and piecewise continuously diﬀerentiable in x.
Strict concavity of the Hamiltonian in (U,Y ) under CON ensures uniqueness.
(By a unique solution, we mean a solution with unique proﬁles {U(x),Y(x)}x and a
proﬁle {ψ(x)}x that is unique except at points of discontinuity.)
The following proposition characterizes solutions to CRM and shows that if
(ye,T e) ∈ B so the incentive compatibility constraint (7) binds, then income-bunching
on an interval [x1,x 2] is generic and CRM can be solved by separately maximizing
revenue obtained from those with productivities lower than xb and revenue obtained
from those with productivities higher than xb. These two optimizations give the
segments of the tax function below and above ye (see ﬁgure 1), where xb is any value
in the interval [x1,x 2] of individuals that earn ye (see ﬂat segments of tax proﬁles in
ﬁgure 2). Proofs of propositions are in an appendix:
Proposition 1 (conditional revenue maximization) If CON holds, CRM has a
unique solution for any (ye,T e), and:
1. For any (ye,T e) ∈ B:
15Existence would be straightforward with a discrete number of productivities but is technically
complicated when productivity has a continuous distribution. Mirrlees (1986, p. 1235) states that
conditions like CON are “obscure” in that they restrict third partial derivatives of u, but are un-
avoidable in variational problems of this type. Note that the previously assumed existence and
uniqueness of {ˆ U(x), ˆ Y (x), ˆ ψ(x)}x is implied by CON, because URM is equivalent to CRM2 with
xb = x−,y e =0 , and Te = −α.
14(a) There is an interval [x1,x 2] with U(x)=Ue(x) and Y (x)=ye for x ∈
[x1,x 2],a n dU(x) >U e(x) for x/ ∈ [x1,x 2].I f [x1,x 2] includes any x ∈
(x−,x +), then x1 <x 2; otherwise, either x1 = x2 = x− or x1 = x2 = x+.
(b) For any xb ∈ [x1,x 2], the solution to CRM1 on [x−,x b] together with
the solution to CRM2 on [xb,x +] also solve CRM. Moreover, R(ye,T e)=
R1(xb,y e,T e)+R2(xb,y e,T e) for all xb ∈ [x1,x 2].
(c) Revenue R(ye,T e) is continuous and diﬀerentiable in (ye,T e), and strictly
increasing in Te. The function T∗
e deﬁned by R(ye,T∗
e(ye)) = G is diﬀer-
entiable.
2. For (ye,T e) / ∈ B, {ˆ U(x), ˆ Y (x), ˆ ψ(x)}x solves CRM and R(ye,T e)= ˆ G.
The function T∗
e described in part 1c of the proposition gives xe’s lowest feasi-
ble own tax payment as a function of ye. In this way, xe’s income choice ye uniquely
determines xe’s leisure 1 − ye/xe, minimum feasible tax payment T∗
e(ye), and con-
sumption ye − T∗
e(ye).
It is convenient to represent xe’s optimization in income-consumption space
where consumption is a good but income is a “bad” because greater income means
less leisure. The set
Ce = {(ye,c e) ≥ 0|ce ≤ ye − T
∗
e(ye)} (10)
is the set of xe’s feasible choices. Note that T∗
e is independent of xe,s ot h es a m e
feasible set Ce is available to all potential election winners. Income and leisure
are negatively related by the identity l =1− y/x,s ot h ew e a kc o n c a v i t yo fu im-
plies that an individual’s indiﬀerence curves in income-consumption space are con-
vex, continuous lines {(y,c) ≥ 0|u = u( c,1 − y/x)}, with slope ul/(xuc) > 0.
The optimal income choice ye is found by maximizing u(ye − T∗
e(ye),1 − ye/xe),
illustrated in ﬁgure 7 as ﬁnding the highest indiﬀerence curve tangent to the up-
per boundary of Ce.A s i n t h e ﬁgure, this boundary is not necessarily concave,
15so there may be multiple optimal ye.D e n o t e xe’s set of optimal income values
y∗
e(xe) ≡ {0 ≤ ye ≤ xe | ye =a r gm a xu(ye − T∗
e(ye),1 − ye/xe)}.
The following proposition characterizes the solution to xe’s modiﬁed problem
and veriﬁes that the solution also solves xe’s original problem:
Proposition 2 (solution to xe’s problem) Assume CON. For any xe ∈ [x−,x +]:
1. A pair (ye,T e) and a set of proﬁles {U(x),Y(x),ψ(x)}x solve xe’s modiﬁed




2. xe’s modiﬁed problem has at least one solution. All solutions satisfy Y (xe)=ye
and U(xe)=Ue(xe)=u(ye − Te,1 − ye/xe).M o r e o v e r ,[x1,x 2] is non-empty,
xe ∈ [x1,x 2],a n d(ye,T∗
e(ye)) ∈ B.F o rye > 0, optimal values of ye satisfy the
ﬁrst-order condition ∂T∗
e/∂ye =1− ul/(ucxe).
3. Proﬁles {U(x),Y(x),ψ(x)}x solve xe’s original problem if and only if (Y (xe),
T∗
e(Y (xe)),{U(x),Y(x),ψ(x)}x) solve xe’s modiﬁed problem.
Because the values of x1 and x2 are conditional on ye, we sometimes write
x1 = x1(ye) and x2 = x2(ye) below.
Seade (1982) points out that agent monotonicity implies that an individual
with greater productivity chooses a greater income. Applied to election winners, this
says that y∗
e(xe) is strictly increasing:16
Proposition 3 (income monotonicity (Seade, 1982)) Let xL <x H be two can-
didates and let yL ∈ y∗
e(xH) and yH ∈ y∗
e(xH). Then yL <y H as long as yH > 0;
otherwise yL = yH =0 .
16Seade (1982) does not contain a proof. A formal proof in the context of our model is available
from the authors.
16The idea is illustrated in ﬁgure 8. At any point (y,c) in income-consumption
space with y>0, agent monotonicity may be written (y/xL)[ul(c,1−y/xL)/uc(c,1−
y/xL)] > (y/xH)[ul(c,1−y/xH)/uc(c,1−y/xH)]; dividing both sides by y shows that
at (y,c), the slope of xL’s indiﬀerence curve exceeds the slope of xH’s indiﬀerence
curve. Thus increased productivity ﬂattens the indiﬀerence curve at (y,c).A l l p o -
tential election winners face the same feasible set Ce, so ﬂatter indiﬀerence curves
shift the optimum (tangency) toward greater ye, and optimal income choices satisfy
yL <y H as long as yH > 0. Similarly yH =0implies yL = yH =0 ;this occurs if xL
and xH are so low that indiﬀerence curves at ye =0are steeper than the boundary
of Ce.
Note from propositions 1 and 2 that xe’s problem has exactly as many dis-
tinct solutions as there are elements in y∗
e(xe). Because y∗
e is strictly monotone by
proposition 3, y∗
e(xe) is single-valued except at isolated xe-values, so xe’s problem
has a unique solution for almost all election winners. To account for the possibility
that one of the candidates may have multiple optimal ye,w ee x p r e s st h ep o l i c yo f
an election winner with any ye ∈ y∗
e(xe) as a function of ye, denoting the associated
income and utility proﬁles {U(x | ye),Y(x | ye)}x.17
The net income-tax function T∗ implied by {U(x | ye),Y(x | ye)}x can then
be inferred from (5), the deﬁnition of T.S p e c i ﬁcally, for any income level y ∈
[Y (x− | ye),Y(x+ | ye)] and any x for which Y (x | ye)=y,t h ei n c o m et a xi s
T∗(y | ye)=T(U(x | ye),Y(x | ye),x).18
To clarify the relationship between T∗ and T∗
e,t h ev a l u eT∗(y | ye) is the
income tax an individual with income y would pay if the election winner earns income
ye, whereas T∗
e(ye) is the minimum tax an election winner with income ye can arrange
17From proposition 3, a given value ye > 0 is optimal for at most one value of xe, so the election
winner’s productivity can always be inferred from ye.
18To extend T∗ to the entire real line, it suﬃces to set taxes prohibitively high (e.g. T∗(y)=y−α)
for y/ ∈ [Y (x−|ye),Y(x+|ye)].
17for him/herself by optimally choosing an income tax function T∗.I t c a n b e s h o w n
that T∗
e is the lower envelope of all tax functions T∗, and that the tax function T∗ set
by a given election winner has a downward spike at y = ye, where T∗ touches T∗
e.
IV. ELECTIONS
Elections between candidates with the same productivity or between candi-
dates who would choose the same ye are uninformative so we study elections be-
tween pairs of candidates xL <x H with yL <y H. For now, take yL ∈ y∗
e(xL) and
yH ∈ y∗





We establish that under two regularity conditions, the utility proﬁles induced
by xL and xH cross only once at a productivity denoted x× with xL <x × <x H,t h a t
individuals x>x × receive greater utility from xH, and that individuals x<x × either
receive greater utility from xL or else receive utility u(α,1) from both candidates.
A graphical intuition is as follows. When xe picks T∗, the individuals in the
economy are presented with a set of (y,c) choices denoted C(ye) ≡ {(y,c) ≥ 0|c ≤
y − T∗(y | ye)}. The downward spike in T∗ at y = ye implies that the boundary of
C(ye) has an upward spike at (ye,y e −T∗
e(ye)), where C(ye) touches the boundary of
Ce (see ﬁgure 9). Individuals x ∈ [x1(ye),x 2(ye)] then ﬁnd a corner solution at income
ye optimal, individuals x<x 1(ye) optimally earn incomes y<y e, and individuals
x>x 2(ye) optimally earn incomes y>y e.
As ye increases diﬀerentially from yL to yH,t h es p i k ep o i n t(ye,y e − T∗
e(ye))
moves monotonically to the right along the boundary of the common feasible set Ce,
illustrated in the ﬁgure by the shift from L to H. This shifts the boundary of C(ye)
18outward for individuals with y>y e (arrow 1 in the ﬁgure), making them strictly
better oﬀ,a n dinward for individuals with y<y e (arrow 2), making them strictly
worse oﬀ as long as U(x) >u (α,1).
Among the set of individuals x ∈ [x1(yH),x 2(yL)] who earn y = ye for any
ye ∈ [yL,y H], agent monotonicity implies that there is a crossover individual x× whose
indiﬀerence curve goes through L and H.19 Because agent monotonicity implies that
indiﬀerence curves become ﬂatter with productivity, it must be that individuals with
productivities greater than x× receive greater utility from xH and individuals with
productivities less than x× receive greater utility from xL.
The regularity conditions we impose to show this single-crossing property en-
sure that the boundary of C(ye) is uniquely deﬁned and changes smoothly with ye.
The boundary of C(ye) is determined by the Euler equations for CRM1 and CRM2.
The ﬁrst regularity condition is therefore CON, which ensures that unique solutions
to CRM1 and CRM2 exist; CON also ﬁlls a role like that of second-order conditions
in comparative static exercises. The second regularity condition is a “no-bunching”
assumption that ensures that the solutions to CRM1 and CRM2 vary smoothly with
ye. To formalize the assumption, let X0(ye) ≡ {x | Y (x | ye)=0 } denote the set of
non-workers given ye. The no-bunching assumption is then:20
Assumption NB: Y (x | ye) increases strictly on [x−,x 1(ye))\X0(ye) and on
(x2(ye),x +] for all ye.
Assumption NB says that the income proﬁle that solves xe’s problem does not
have ﬂat spots (“bunching”) at any productivity except those that lead to incomes
of zero or ye.
19This assumes yL and yH are close. If they are not close, [x1(yH),x 2(yL)] may be empty and the
crossover individual may have a tangency on a leg of a spike. Proposition 4 below allows for such
cases.
20This type of assumption is common in the literature that follows Mirrlees (1971).
19A complication is that there may be a set of individuals at the lower end of
the productivity distribution who would obtain utility u(α,1) from both candidates.
To treat this, let Xmin(ye)={x | U(x | ye)=u(α,1)} denote the set of individuals
who would obtain utility u(α,1) from a candidate with income ye.21
Assumptions CON and NB are suﬃcient for:
Proposition 4 (single crossing of utility proﬁles) Consider candidates xL <x H.
Assume CON, NB, and take yL ∈ y∗
e(xL) and yH ∈ y∗
e(xH) as given with yL <y H.
Then utility proﬁles {U(x | yH)}x and {U(x | yL)}x cross at a unique point x× ∈
(xL,x H),a n d :
1. Individuals x>x × have U(x | yH) >U(x | yL);
2. Individuals x<x × with x/ ∈ Xmin(yL) have U(x | yL) >U(x | yH);
3. Individuals x = x× have U(x | yL)=U(x | yH);a n d
4. Individuals in Xmin(yL) have U(x | yL)=U(x | yH)=u(α,1).
Note that because Xmin(yH) consists of Xmin(yL) plus the set of x for whom
U(x | yL) >U (x | yH)=u(α,1), individuals in Xmin(yH) who are not in Xmin(yL)
receive strictly higher utility from xL.
A key assumption underlying proposition 4 is that xe is able to impose an
unrestricted tax function. Ad hoc restrictions on the tax function (for instance, that
it be quadratic or piecewise linear) may cause utility proﬁles to cross several times,
leading to voting cycles. Intuitively, this is because proposition 4 relies on incentive
constraints that restrict utility diﬀerences of individuals close in productivity, with
21Because U and Y are increasing, Xmin(ye) and X0(ye) are at the lower end of the income
distribution. If Xmin(ye) has positive measure then Xmin(ye)=X0(ye),b u tX0(ye) may have
positive measure even if Xmin(ye) has measure zero.
20individuals treated monotonically better the closer they are to the election winner.
This monotone link may be disrupted by restrictions on the functional form of T∗.
Median-Voter Results
Proposition 4 forms the basis for median-voter results. If Xmin(yL) has measure
zero and the mapping y∗
e is single-valued at xL and xH, the logic is simple. The
proposition implies that all individuals with productivity greater than x× have U(x |
yL) >U (x | yH) and hence vote for xH.I f x× <x M, a majority that includes
median-productivity individuals therefore votes for xH. Similarly all individuals with
productivity less than x× who are not in Xmin(yL) have U(x | yH) >U (x | yL).
Because Xmin(yL) has measure zero, this implies that almost all individuals with
productivity less than x× vote for xL.I f xM <x ×,am a j o r i t yt h a ti n c l u d e sxM
therefore votes for xL. Thus median-productivity individuals always vote with the
winning majority. (In the non-generic case in which xM = x×, the election ends in a
tie.)
There are two possible complications that require additional assumptions.
First, individuals in Xmin(yL) have U(x | yL)=U(x | yH) and are indiﬀerent, and
assumptions about how such individuals vote matter if (and only if) Xmin(yL) has
positive measure. Three alternative reasonable assumptions might be made: individ-
uals in Xmin(yL) vote for xL, who is closer to the individual’s own productivity and
income (voting by closeness);22 they abstain; or they randomize. Randomization is
formally similar to abstention under simple assumptions about how randomization
occurs, so we consider only voting by closeness and abstention.
22In the spirit of Benabou and Ok (2001), a preference for xL by a nonworker with current utility
u(α,1) w o u l db ee x p e c t e di na ne x t e n d e dm o d e li nw h i c hf u t u r ep r o d u c t i v i t yi sr a n d o ma n dt h e r e
is a positive probability the individual will work and have utility greater than u(α,1) during some
part of the winner’s term of oﬃce.
21When voters in Xmin(yL) vote by closeness, proposition 4 again implies that
the winning majority contains all individuals with median productivity. When voters
in Xmin(yL) abstain, the statement of the median-voter result changes: all voters with
median productivity among those who do not abstain vote with the winning majority.
Voters in Xmin(yL) and x× abstain but the latter have measure zero, so voters with
median productivity in [x−,x +]\Xmin(yL) always vote with the majority.
The second complication arises if the mapping y∗
e is not single-valued at xL
or xH, because the speciﬁc values chosen in y∗
e(xL) or y∗
e(xH) may then aﬀect voting.
The complication is non-generic because y∗
e is single-valued except at isolated points.
In cases where more than one income-value gives a candidate the same utility, we
assume the candidate chooses ye to maximize the own vote share. This is natural
because winning gives higher utility than losing.
For xH, proposition 4 implies that choosing yH =m i n {y∗
e(xH)} yields the
lowest crossing point x× and therefore maximizes xH’s vote share against any income
chosen by xL. Similarly yL =m a x {y∗
e(xL)} yields the highest crossing point for xL
and therefore maximizes xL’s vote share against xH, provided Xmin(yL) has measure
zero or individuals vote by closeness. If Xmin(yL) has positive measure and individuals
in Xmin(yL) abstain, however, an income choice less than max{y∗
e(xL)} may maximize
xL’s vote share because the number of abstentions may then rise with yL. In this case,





Proposition 5 (median-voter theorem) Consider candidates xL <x H. Assume
CON, NB, yH =m i n {y∗
e(xH)} > 0, and that xL chooses the yL ∈ y∗
e(xL) that maxi-
mizes xL’s vote share against xH:
1. If Xmin(yL) has measure zero, then the candidate who provides greater utility to
22median-productivity individuals wins.
2. If Xmin(yL) has positive measure and
(a) if indiﬀerent individuals vote based on closeness in productivity, then the
candidate who provides greater utility to median-productivity individuals
wins, or
(b) if indiﬀerent individuals abstain, then the candidate who provides greater
utility to the median of [x−,x +]\Xmin(yL) wins.
Parts 1 and 2a of proposition 5 immediately imply:
Proposition 6 (Condorcet winner) Assume CON, NB, and yM ≡ min{y∗
e(xM)} >
0.T h e nxM is the Condorcet winner if Xmin(yM) has measure zero, or if Xmin(yM) has
positive measure and indiﬀerent individuals vote based on closeness in productivity.
When Xmin(yM) has positive measure and indiﬀerent voters abstain (case 2b
of proposition 5), the existence of a Condorcet winner is not guaranteed because the
set of individuals who vote then depends on the speciﬁc candidate pair.23
V. THE SHAPE OF THE ELECTION WINNER’S TAX FUNCTION
To describe the shape of the tax function T∗ set by a generic election winner
xe with income ye ∈ y∗
e(xe), we derive the marginal tax schedule dT ∗(y)/dy.
23By a simple ﬁxed-point argument, there is always a smallest productivity xm ∈ (xM,x +) that
is median in the set [x−,x +]\Xmin(min{y∗
e(xm)}).B e c a u s e xL <x m may draw individuals in
Xmin(min{y∗
e(xm)}) to the polls, xL may win against xm, and because xL is below the median in
[x−,x +]\Xmin(min{y∗
e(xL)}), xL may lose against an xl ∈ (xL,x m) who in turn may lose against
xm, forming a cycle. If xm wins against all xL <x m, however, then xm is a Condorcet winner. This
occurs if no xL induces enough individuals in Xmin(min{y∗
e(xm)}) to vote.
23From Section III, the income tax satisﬁes T∗(Y (x)) = T(U(x),Y(x),x) for
all x.O n i n t e r v a l s w h e r e Y has a diﬀerentiable inverse Y −1, we may substitute
x = Y −1(y) into this expression for T∗, diﬀerentiate with respect to y,a n di m p o s e
incentive compatibility (3) to obtain dT ∗(y)/dy = TY(U(Y −1(y)),y,Y−1(y)).24 For




The following proposition characterizes the marginal tax schedule as τ(Y −1(y)).
As part of the proposition, we show that (11) holds at all points where Y −1 is well-
deﬁned regardless of diﬀerentiability. By NB, Y −1 is well-deﬁned at all incomes
except y = ye and possibly y =0 . We use the solution to CRM1 conditional on
(xe,y e,T∗
e(ye)) to evaluate τ(x) for x<x 1, and use the solution to CRM2 conditional
on (xe,y e,T∗
e(ye)) to evaluate τ(x) for x>x 2:
Proposition 7 (the net-income-tax function chosen by xe) Assume CON and
NB and consider xe ∈ (x−,x +) with ye > 0.25 Then T∗ is continuously diﬀerentiable
on [Y (x−),Y(x+)] except at y = ye, with dT∗(y)/dy = τ(Y −1(y)) except at ye and
possibly at zero.26 Moreover:
1. T∗ is always nonlinear in that the marginal tax rate jumps upward at ye. Specif-
ically: τ(x1)=limy↑yedT∗(y)/dy < τ(x2)=limy↓yedT∗(y)/dy.
2. T∗ is strictly increasing for y>y e.I fx+ is ﬁnite, dT∗(Y (x+))/dy = τ(x+)=0 .
3. T∗ has three possible shapes for y<y e:
24More heuristically, at any point where T∗ is diﬀerentiable, an individual who maximizes u(y −
T∗(y),1 − y/x) by choice of y satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition dT∗(y)/dy =1− ul/(ucx).F r o m
section III, the right-hand side of the condition equals TY .
25Cases with xe = x−,x e = x+, and ye =0are straightforward but give degenerate results in
which [x0,x 1)\X0, [x1,x 2],o r(x2,x +] are empty or contain a single point.
26If X0(ye) is an interval, Y −1(0) is not deﬁned and dT∗(0)/dy = τ(maxX0).
24(a) T∗ may be strictly decreasing. As u ﬃcient condition for this is that the
minimum-utility constraint (1) does not bind. If X0(ye) has measure zero,
then dT∗(Y (x−))/dy = τ(x−)=0 .
(b) T∗ may increase strictly from Y (x−) to a local maximum at Y (xτ),t h e n
decrease strictly to ye. T h i so c c u r si fa n do n l yi fτ(xτ)=0for some
xτ ∈ (x−,x 1)\X0(ye).
(c) T∗ may be strictly increasing.
Part 1 says that the tax function has a kink at the election winner’s own
income level, with T∗ having a lower slope from the right than from the left. Thus
the tax function is always nonlinear.
Because the kinked function T∗ is strictly better than a linear tax for the
winner and the associated utility proﬁle U is continuous, there is an interval of pro-
ductivities around xe that also are better oﬀ under T∗ than under a linear tax. From
the median-voter results of the previous section, if one of the candidates has produc-
tivity close to the median, the resulting redistributional tax policy is better than a
linear tax for a range of middle-productivity individuals. This result is in accord with
Director’s Law.
Results in part 2 describe taxes at incomes above ye and resemble results in
Seade (1977, 1982) and Röell (1996): income taxes rise with income; and the marginal
tax rate is zero at the maximum productivity x+ if x+ < ∞.
Results in part 3 state that the tax function T∗ may have three shapes at
incomes below ye. If the minimum-utility constraint (1) does not bind (case a) then
T∗ decreases monotonically over [Y (x−),y e) as the election winner extracts greater
taxes from individuals the lower their incomes. Such an outcome is counterfactual.
For marginal rates not to be negative on [Y (x−),y e), the minimum utility constraint
must bind. If (1) binds, T∗ may still have a counterfactual downward sloping segment
25(case b), or it may have positive marginal rates throughout (case c); in both cases,
marginal rates can be high at very low incomes (see ﬁg u r e s1 ,5 ,a n d6 ) .
Whether case (b) or (c) describes the tax function depends on the revenue
requirement G and the level of the altruistic consumption ﬂoor α. With no revenue
requirement or altruism (G =0and α =0 ) ,i tc a nb es h o w nt h a tT∗(ye) < 0 whereas
T∗(Y (x−)) ≥ 0. This says that the election winner pays lower taxes than an individual
with productivity x−,s oT∗ necessarily has a downward sloping segment (case b). If
G and α are high enough, however, marginal tax rates are positive throughout:27
Proposition 8 (the role of G and α in determining the slope of T∗) Assume
CON and NB and consider solutions to xe’s problem with G< ˆ G(α).T h e n :
1. For G i nan e i g h b o r h o o do f ˆ G(α) for given α,t h et a xf u n c t i o nT∗ is strictly
increasing on [Y (x−),Y(x+)].
2. For α in a neighborhood of ˆ G−1(G) for given G, the tax function T∗ is strictly
increasing on [Y (x−),Y(x+)].
T h ep r o o fs t u d i e sp a r a m e t r i cv a r i a t i o n si nG and α. The proposition shows
that the tendencies illustrated in ﬁgures 5 and 6 are generic.
VI. CONCLUSION
We study a simple form of representative democracy in which voters elect a
single candidate who then imposes redistributional taxes on all citizens. We provide
conditions for the winning candidate to receive the votes of median-productivity in-
dividuals, so a median-productivity candidate is a Condorcet winner. We also show
that the tax function imposed by the election winner is always nonlinear, may have
27Röell (1996) assumes G =0and α =0 , which implies that the tax function necessarily has
negative marginal rates at some incomes.
26positive marginal rates at all incomes if government faces non-redistributional spend-
ing requirements or if individuals are altruistic, and may impose high marginal tax
rates at very low incomes.
Two assumptions are crucial for the median-voter results. The ﬁrst and no
doubt strongest is one-dimensional heterogeneity of candidates; if candidates (the
objects over which voting occurs) diﬀer along more than one dimension, voting cycles
arise generally. The advantage of assuming such one-dimensional heterogeneity is that
it allows analysis of how economic forces inﬂuence the shape of the tax function. The
alternative approach of ruling out cycling by imposing linearity on the tax function
precludes such analysis.
The second crucial assumption is that no restrictions are placed on the func-
tional form of the tax function. Although a median-voter result was obtained by
Meltzer and Richard (1981) by restricting the tax function to be linear, other restric-
tions can upset a median-voter outcome.
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29APPENDIX: PROOFS
Proposition 1 Overview: For (ye,T e) / ∈ B, we show that solutions to URM solve
CRM, establishing part 2 of the proposition. For (ye,T e) ∈ B,w eﬁrst deﬁne xb1 ≡
min{x | Ue(x) ≥ ˆ U(x)} (see ﬁgure A1). Let (i) subscripts mark solutions to CRMi
for i =1 ,2. W ec o n s t r u c tt h ei n t e r v a l[x1,x 2] by solving CRM2 conditional on
(xb1,y e,T e), deﬁning x2 ≡ sup{x | Y(2)(x)=ye}, then solving CRM1 conditional on
(x2,y e,T e) and deﬁning x1 ≡ min{x | Y(1)(x)=ye}. The interval [x1,x 2] has constant
income Y (x)=ye and hence constant utility U(x)=Ue(x) as in part 1a. We combine
the solutions to CRM1 and CRM2 conditional on (x2,y e,T e) as
{Ub(x),Y b(x)}x ≡ {U(1)(x),Y (1)(x)}x≤x2 ∪ {U(2)(x),Y (2)(x)}x≥x2.
The remainder of parts 1a-b are established by showing that {Ub(x),Y b(x)}x solves
CRM, and that the combined solutions to CRM1 and CRM2 conditional on (xb,y e,T e)
for any xb ∈ [x1,x 2] also equal {Ub(x),Y b(x)}x and hence yield the same revenue. The
properties of R in part 1c follow from parametric variation/value function arguments.
Given R, the existence and diﬀerentiability of T∗
e follows from the implicit function
theorem.
Details: CON and the Mangasarian suﬃciency theorem imply that: CRM1
30and CRM2 have solutions with unique proﬁles {U(x),Y(x)}x; the conditions of the
Maximum Principle are suﬃcient for optimality; and Y is continuous. Because Y is
unique, its derivative ψ to is uniquely deﬁned except at points of discontinuity. This
uniqueness implies the uniqueness of the solution to CRM.
For (ye,T e) / ∈ B,w eh a v eˆ U(x) ≥ Ue(x) for all x so the solution to URM
satisﬁes (7) and hence is optimal for CRM. The proﬁles {ˆ U(x), ˆ Y (x)}x are unique
by CON because URM is equivalent to CRM2 conditional on (xb = x−,y e =0 ,T e =
−α).28 The deﬁnition of ˆ G implies R(ye,T e)= ˆ G for (ye,T e) / ∈ B.
For (ye,T e) ∈ B, the solution to URM does not satisfy (7). Because CRM1
and CRM2 conditional on (xb,y e,T e) for any xb ∈ [x1,x 2] satisfy (7) by construction,
the combined solutions to CRM1 on [x−,x b] and CRM2 on [xb,x +] must diﬀer from
the solution to URM.
Because URM does not satisfy (7), the sets {x | Ue(x) > ˆ U(x)} and hence
{x | Ue(x) ≥ ˆ U(x)} are nonempty so xb1 =m i n {x | Ue(x) ≥ ˆ U(x)} exists. Consider
CRM2 conditional on (xb1,y e,T e). Its solution proﬁles {U(2)(x),Y (2)(x)}x are unique
and U(2)(xb1)=Ue(xb1),s oY(2)(xb1)=ye. Thus {x : Y(2)(x)=ye} is non-empty so x2
is well-deﬁned.
The special case with xb1 = x2 is considered below; for now, assume xb1 <x 2.
It cannot be that x2 = ∞ is optimal (when x+ = ∞) because higher revenue could
then be extracted from high-productivity individuals by assigning them incomes above
ye.S p e c i ﬁcally, deﬁne
τ(x|ye,T e) ≡ 1 −
u1(ye − Te,1 − ye/x)
uc(ye − Te,1 − ye/x)x
.
Agent monotonicity implies that τ(x|ye,T e) is strictly increasing in x and converges to
one as x →∞ .T h u st h e r ei sa nxτ < ∞ such that τ(x|ye,T e) > 0 for all x>x τ. From
28In CRM2 conditional on (x−,0,−α), the constraint Y (xb) ≥ ye holds trivially and the constraint
U(xb)=Ue(xb) reduces to U(x−)=u(α,1). The Euler equation (9) for URM implies ξ(x−) < 0 so
(1) binds, that is, U(x−)=u(α,1).
31(5) and TY(Ue(x),y e,x)=τ(x|ye,T e), an upward variation in Y (x) for all x ∈ (xτ,x +]
holding U(x) constant then raises T,s oap o l i c yw i t hY (x)=ye for all x ≥ xb1, that
is, with x2 = ∞, cannot be optimal.
From x2 < ∞, it follows that x2 =m a x {x : Y(2)(x)=ye},s oY(2)(x2)=ye and
U(2)(x2)=Ue(x2).
Consider CRM1 conditional on (x2,y e,T e) and note that x1 =m i n {x : Y(1)(x)=
ye}. CRM1 conditional on (x2,y e,T e) and CRM2 conditional on (xb1,y e,T e) have
matching utility and income values at x2,o rU(1)(x2)=U(2)(x2)=Ue(x2) and
Y(1)(x2)=Y(2)(x2)=ye,s ot h es o l u t i o n st ob o t hC R M 1a n dC R M 2c a nh o l ds i -
multaneously and {Ub(x),Y b(x)}x is well-deﬁned at x2.
The special case with x1 = x2 (and xb1 <x 2) is also be considered below;
for now, assume x− ≤ x1 <x 2 ≤ x+. By construction, the combined proﬁles
{Ub(x),Y b(x)}x have Ub(x)=Ue(x) and Yb(x)=ye for x ∈ [x1,x 2], and Yb(x) 6= ye
for x/ ∈ [x1,x 2]. Because Ub(x)=Ue(x) implies Yb(x)=ye and Ub(x) ≥ Ue(x) always
holds, it must be that Ub(x) >U e(x) whenever Yb(x) 6= ye, that is, for x/ ∈ [x1,x 2].
CON implies that the unique solution proﬁles of CRM1 and CRM2 conditional
on (xb,y e,T e) for any xb ∈ [x1,x 2] are the same as {Ub(x),Y b(x)}x, and hence yield
the same revenue Rb ≡ R(ye,T e). To prove the optimality of {Ub(x),Y b(x)}x,s u p p o s e
to the contrary that an alternative proﬁle {Ua(x),Y a(x)}x satisﬁed the constraints of
CRM and yielded revenue Ra >R b. There are two possibilities:
(a) If Ya(xa)=ye for any xa ∈ [x−,x +] then the combined solutions to CRM1
and CRM2 conditional on (xa,y e,T e), denoted {U∗
a(x),Y∗
a (x)}x, would yield revenue
R∗
a ≥ Ra >R b. Because any xb ∈ [x1,x 2] yields revenue Rb,i tm u s tb et h a txa / ∈
[x1,x 2]. Hence either min{x : Y ∗
a (x)=ye} >x 2 or max{x : Y ∗
a (x)=ye} <x 1.
Consider min{x : Y ∗
a (x)=ye} >x 2. CRM2 conditional on (x2,y e,T e) satisﬁes the
transversality condition ξ(2)(x+)=0and the Euler equation ξ(2),x(x)=−HU > 0 for
x ≥ x2,s oξ(2)(x2) < 0.F o r x>x 2 we have Y(2)(x) >y e so ψ(x) > 0 and hence
32µ(2)(x)=0in a neighborhood above x2.T h u sµ(2),x(x2)=0 .I n( 8 ) ,µ(2),x(x2)=0
and ξ(2)(x2) < 0 imply τ(x2|ye,T e) > 0. Because τ(x|ye,T e) is strictly increasing in
x, τ(x|ye,T e) > 0 for x ∈ [x2,x +]. Again using (5), a compensated upward variation
in Y ∗
a on {x : Y ∗
a (x)=ye} ⊂ [x2,x +] would then increase revenue so {U∗
a(x),Y∗
a (x)}x
is not revenue maximizing, a contradiction. Analogous logic applies if x1 > max{x :
Y ∗
a (x)=ye}.
(b) If Ya(x) 6= ye for all x then the continuity of Ya implies that either
Ya(x) <y e or Ya(x) >y e for all x.I f Ya(x) <y e then {Ua(x),Y a(x)} is feasible for
CRM1 conditional on (x+,y e,T e) so Ra ≤ R1(x+,y e,T e). Similarly if Ya(x) >y e then
{Ua(x),Y a(x)} is feasible for CRM2 conditional on (x−,y e,T e) so Ra ≤ R2(x−,y e,T e).
The feasible sets for CRM1 conditional on (x+,y e,T e) and for CRM2 conditional on
(x−,y e,T e) are in the feasible set for CRM, so Rb ≥ max{R1(x,ye,T e),R 2(x−,y e,T e) ≥
Ra, also a contradiction. Thus {Ub(x),Y b(x)}x is optimal.
We now consider the two special cases xb1 = x2 and xb1 <x 1 = x2, and show
that these correspond to the boundary cases with x− = x1 = x2 and x+ = x1 = x2 in
part 1a:
(1) Suppose xb1 = x2: URM restricted to any [x−,x b] satisﬁes all suﬃcient
optimality conditions for CRM1 conditional on (xb,y e,T e) except Y(1)(xb) ≤ ye and
Ue(xb)=U(1)(xb).I f x− <x b1 = x2,t h e nUe(xb1)=ˆ U(xb1) and ˆ Y (xb1)=ye,s o
{ˆ U(x), ˆ Y (x)} on [x−,x b1] is the unique solution to CRM1 conditional on (xb1,y e,T e).
The combined solutions of CRM1 on [x−,x b1] and CRM2 on [xb1,x +] then satisfy the
suﬃcient conditions for a solution to URM on [x−,x +], contradicting (ye,T e) ∈ B.29
29For the combined solutions of CRM1 and CRM2 to satisfy all suﬃcient conditions for a solu-
tion to URM, solutions must match at xb1, that is, Y(1)(xb1)=Y(2)(xb1),U (1)(xb1)=U(2)(xb1),
µ(1)(xb1)=µ(2)(xb1), and ξ(1)(xb1)=ξ(2)(xb1).T h e ﬁrst two hold by construction. From
Y(1)(x) <y e for x<x b1 we have µ(1)(x)=0in a neighborhood of xb1, and hence from (8),
H(1),Y (xb1)=0 . Similarly, Y(2)(x) >y e for x>x 2 implies µ(2)(x)=0in a neighborhood of x2 and
hence H(2),Y (x2)=0 .T h u sH(1),Y (xb1)=H(2),Y (xb1), which implies ξ(1)(xb1)=ξ(2)(xb1).
33Thus x2 = x−. This is a boundary case in which the constraint U(2)(x) ≥ Ue(x)
binds only at x−, and the solution to CRM2 conditional on (x−,y e,T e) is the unique
solution to CRM. In this case, x1 = x− so x− = x1 = x2.
(2) Suppose x1 = x2 with xb1 <x 2:I fx2 <x +,t h e nUe(x2)=ˆ U(x2) and
ˆ Y (x2)=ye,s o{ˆ U(x), ˆ Y (x)} on [x2,x +] is the unique solution to CRM2 conditional
on (x2,y e,T e). The combined solutions of CRM1 on [x−,x 2] and CRM2 on [x2,x +]
then satisfy the suﬃcient conditions for a solution to URM on [x−,x +], contradicting
(ye,T e) ∈ B.T h u s x1 = x2 = x+ < ∞. This is a boundary case in which the
constraint U(1)(x) ≥ Ue(x) binds only at x+, and the solution to CRM1 conditional
on (x+,y e,T e) is the unique solution to CRM.
Standard value-function results imply that R1 and R2 are continuous and
diﬀerentiable with respect to (ye,T e) ∈ B.T os i g n∂R/∂Te when x1 <x 2,c h o o s ea n y
xb ∈ (x1,x 2). Because solutions to CRM1 and CRM2 are unique, so is R = R1 + R2,
and
∂R/∂Te = ∂R1(xb,y e,T e)/∂Te + ∂R2/∂Te(xb,y e,T e) (12)
=[ ξ(1)(xb) − ξ(2)(xb)] · uc(ye − Te,1 − ye/xb). (13)
Subtract (9) for CRM2 conditional on (x1,y e,T e) from (9) for CRM1 conditional on
(x2,y e,T e) to obtain
ξ(1),x(x) − ξ(2),x(x)=−ωU(Ue(x),y e,x) · (ξ(1)(x) − ξ(2)(x)), for x ∈ [x1,x 2]. (14)
This is a homogenous linear diﬀerential equation so ξ(1) − ξ(2) cannot change
sign on [x1,x 2]. Taking similar diﬀerences of Euler equations (8) and integrating over




ωY(Ue(x),y e,x) · [ξ(1)(x) − ξ(2)(x)]dx (15)
= µ(2)(xb)+µ(1)(x1) − µ(2)(x1) − µ(1)(xb). (16)
34Because ψ(x) ≥ 0 implies µ(i)(x) ≤ 0 and the optimality conditions of CRM1 and
CRM2 imply µ(1)(x1)=0and µ(2)(x2)=0 , it follows that I(x2) ≥ 0 and hence
ξ(1)(xb) − ξ(2)(xb) ≥ 0.I f ξ(1)(xb)=ξ(2)(xb) then (14) implies ξ(1)(x)=ξ(2)(x) for
x ∈ [x1,x 2] so I(x2)=0 , whence µ(2)(x1)=µ(1)(x2)=0 . From (8), τ(x1|ye,T e)=
τ(x2|ye,T e) and because τ is strictly increasing, x1 = x2, contradicting x1 <x 2.T h u s
ξ(1)(xb) − ξ(2)(xb) > 0, (17)
so ∂R/∂Te > 0.
In the special case with x− = x1 = x2, the transversality condition ξ(2)(x+)=0
and (9) imply ξ(2)(x−) < 0,w h e n c e∂R/∂Te = −ξ(2)(x−) · uc > 0. In the special case
with x1 = x2 = x+, the solution to CRM1 conditional on (x+,y e,T e) has ξ(1)(x+) ≥ 0
and cannot satisfy the suﬃcient conditions for a solution to URM, so ξ(1)(x+) 6=0
whence ∂R/∂Te = ξ(1)(x+) · uc > 0.
Proposition 2 1. From the deﬁnition of R,ag i v e n(ye,T e) satisﬁes the feasibility
constraint R(ye,T e) ≥ G, if and only if proﬁles {U(x),Y(x),ψ(x)}x e x i s tt h a ts a t i s f y
the constraints of xe’s modiﬁed problem (equations (1), (3), (4), (6), and (7)). Hence
(ye,T e,{U(x),Y(x),ψ(x)}x) solves xe’s modiﬁed problem if and only if (ye,T e) maxi-
mizes u(ye−Te,1−ye/xe) subject to R(ye,T e) ≥ G.V a l u e sTe <T ∗
e(ye) are infeasible
and values Te >T ∗
e(ye) are suboptimal because xe could raise u(ye − Te,1 − ye/xe)
by reducing Te.T h u s Te = T∗
e(ye) in any solution to xe’s modiﬁed problem, so
R(ye,T e)=G. The latter implies that proﬁles {U(x),Y(x),ψ(x)}x induce maximum
revenue and therefore solve CRM. Given Te = T∗
e(ye), maximizing u(ye−Te,1−ye/xe)
means that ye maximizes u(ye − T∗
e(ye),1 − ye/xe), as claimed. Non-negative leisure
implies 0 ≤ ye ≤ xe.
2. A solution exists because ye maximizes a continuous function on the com-




ucxe). (The assumption liml→0ul/uc = ∞ rules out a corner solution
35at ye = xe.) Solutions to xe’s modiﬁed problem satisfy U(xe) ≥ Ue(xe) because (7)
holds for x = xe.I f U(xe) >U e(xe) then xe could raise own utility by choosing
(Y (xe),T(xe)) instead of (ye,T e), contradicting optimality. Thus U(xe)=Ue(xe).
Because R(ye,T∗
e(ye)) = G< ˆ G,i tm u s tb et h a t(ye,T∗
e(ye)) ∈ B. From proposition
1, part 1a, [x1,x 2] is non-empty, xe ∈ [x1,x 2], and Y (xe)=ye.
3. Any proﬁles {U(x),Y(x),ψ(x)}x that are feasible for xe’s original problem
a r ef e a s i b l ef o rt h em o d i ﬁed problem by taking ye = Y (xe) and Te = T(U(xe),y e,x e).
Therefore the utility xe obtains under the original problem is less than or equal to the
utility xe obtains in any solution to the modiﬁed problem. From part 2, any solution to
the modiﬁed problem satisﬁes Y (xe)=ye and U(xe)=Ue(xe)=u(ye−Te,1−ye/xe),
so c∗(U(xe),Y(xe)/xe)=ye − Te, and (2) implies (7). All solutions to the modiﬁed
problem therefore have proﬁles in the feasible set of the original problem, so any
solution to the modiﬁed problem solves the original problem. Moreover, xe’s utility
is equal under the modiﬁed and original problems, so any solution to xe’s original
problem solves the modiﬁed problem.
Proposition 4 We compare {U(x | yL)}x and {U(x | yH)}x for given x by integrat-
ing ∂U(x | ye)/∂ye over [yL,y H].A tp o i n t sxe where y∗
e is single-valued, proposition
3 also implies that y∗
e has an inverse, denoted x∗
e(ye), that is single-valued, contin-
uous, and strictly increasing. At points xe where y∗
e is multi-valued, the Maximum
Theorem implies that y∗
e is compact-valued so min{y∗
e(xe)} and max{y∗
e(xe)} exist;
for ye ∈ [min{y∗
e(xe)},max{y∗
e(xe)], either x∗
e(ye)=xe or else x∗
e(ye) is undeﬁned.
We ﬁrst consider subintervals of [yL,y H] over which x∗
e is strictly increasing,
then deal with subintervals over which x∗
e is constant or undeﬁned; because each of
the latter subintervals is associated with an xe at which y∗
e is multi-valued, the latter
subintervals have the form [min{y∗
e(xe)},max{y∗
e(xe)}].
Consider ye ∈ (yL,y H) at which x∗
e is strictly increasing. From proposition 1,
36the solution to CRM conditional on (ye,T∗
e(ye)) has U(x)=Ue(x) and Y (x)=ye
on an interval [x1,x 2]. Because x1 ≤ xe ≤ x2 from proposition 2, part 2, and x− ≤
x∗
e(yL) <x e = x∗
e(ye) <x ∗
e(yH) ≤ x+, proposition 1 (part 1a) implies x1 <x 2.
We consider in sequence given x-values in the intervals [x1,x 2], [x2,x +], and
[x−,x 1]:
(1) For x ∈ [x1,x 2], where U(x | ye)=Ue(x):
∂U(x | ye)/∂ye = ∂Ue(x)/∂ye =[ uc − ul/x] − uc · ∂T
∗
e/∂ye (18)
= uc · [τ(x|ye,T e) − ∂T
∗
e/∂ye]=uc · [τ(x|ye,T e) − τ(xe|ye,T e)],
where the last step uses the ﬁrst-order condition in proposition 2. Because the en-
velope theorem implies ∂U(xe | ye)/∂ye =0at xe = x∗
e(ye) and agent monotonicity
implies that τ(x|ye,T e) and hence ∂U(x | ye)/∂ye are strictly increasing in x, it follows
that ∂U(x | ye)/∂ye < 0 for x ∈ [x1,x e) and ∂U(x | ye)/∂ye > 0 for x ∈ (xe,x 2].
For use below, we need to show that
∂U(x1 | ye)/∂ye < 0 (19)
∂U(x2 | ye)/∂ye > 0. (20)
From above, these follow if xe 6= x1 and xe 6= x2.D i ﬀerentiate the government budget
R(ye,T∗
e(ye)) = G totally to get ∂R(Te,y e)/∂ye + ∂R(Te,y e)/∂Te · ∂T∗
e(xe)/∂ye =0
and insert ∂R(Te,y e)/∂ye = ∂Ue(x)/∂ye[ξ2(xe) − ξ1(xe)] − µ(1)(xe)+µ(2)(xe), which
is the value-function result analogous to (12), as well as ∂R(Te,y e)/∂Te from (12)
and ∂T∗
e(xe)/∂ye = τ(xe|ye,T e) from proposition 2, then apply (18) and reduce to
µ(1)(xe)=µ(2)(xe). If xe = x1 then the optimality conditions for CRM1 imply
µ(1)(x1)=µ(2)(x1)=0 . For x<x 1, the construction of x1 implies Y (x) <y e so
µ(1)(x)=0 . Thus µ(1)(x)=0for x ∈ [x−,x 1], which implies µ(1),x(x1)=0and hence
from (8) that H(1),Y =0at x1. Then (17) and (8) imply H(2),Y = −µ(2),x(x1) < 0.
Because µ(2)(x1)=0 , it must be that µ(2)(x) > 0 for some x>x 1, contradicting the
37optimality condition µ(2)(x) ≤ 0. Thus xe 6= x1, which implies (19). The proof that
xe 6= x2, which implies (20), is analogous.
(2) For x ∈ [x2,x +], NB implies µx(x)=0in (8) so HY =0 , where subscripts
(2) for CRM2 are suppressed. Because HYY < 0 b yC O N ,t h ei n c o m el e v e lY ≡
y(U,ξ,x) that satisﬁes HY(x,U,Y,ψ,ξ,0) = 0 is a well-deﬁned function of (U,ξ,x)
that is diﬀerentiable in (U,ξ). From (3) and (9), U(x | ye) and ξ(x | ye) then satisfy
the diﬀerential equations
Ux(x | ye)=ω(U(x | ye),y(U(x | ye),ξ(x | ye),x),x)
ξx(x | ye)=−TU(U(x | ye),y(U(x | ye),ξ(x | ye),x),x)f(x) (21)
−ξ(x | ye) · ωU(U(x | ye),y(U(x | ye),ξ(x | ye),x),x).
System (21) is saddle-path stable because the characteristic matrix has zero
trace and, from CON, a negative determinant. Hence, a solution to (21) (which exists
by CON) is uniquely determined by the two boundary conditions U(x2 | ye)=Ue(x2),
and ξ(x+ | ye)=0if x+ < ∞ or limx→∞ ξ(x | ye)=0if x+ = ∞. For given ye,( 2 1 )
and Y = y(U,ξ,x) uniquely determine {U(x | ye),Y(x | ye)}x on [x2,x +].S a d d l e -
path stability implies that an increase in ye that raises Ue(x2) must increase U(x | ye)
for x ≥ x2. The derivative U0(x) ≡ ∂U(x | ye)/∂ye exists for x ≥ x2 and is found in
two steps. First, diﬀerentiate (21) with respect to ye to obtain30
∂U




0(x)/∂x = γξ0U(U,ξ,x) · U
0(x) − γ(U,ξ,x) · ξ
0(x),
where ξ
0(x) ≡ ∂ξ(x | ye)/∂ye, γ(U,ξ,x)=ωU − ωY · HYU/HYY, γU0ξ(U,ξ,x)=
−ωYY > 0 and γξ0U(U,ξ,x)=−[HYY·HUU−HYU·HYU]/HYY > 0. Second, solve (22)
subject to the boundary conditions that U0(x2) is given and ξ
0(x+)=0 . (These are
30The notation U0(x) highlights that these are ordinary diﬀerential equations in x at given ye.
Also, derivatives are one-sided at set boundaries here and below.
38the derivatives of the boundary conditions for (21).) Because (21) has a characteristic
matrix with zero trace and a negative determinant, it is saddle-path stable. This with
U0(x2) > 0 from (20) implies U0(x) > 0, or ∂U(x | ye)/∂ye > 0 for x ∈ [x2,x +].
(3) For x ∈ [x−,x 1], let x0(ye) ≡ inf{x ≥ x− : Y (x | ye) > 0} denote the lower
bound of values of x at which earnings are positive. CRM1 applies so we suppress
subscripts (1) below. As in case (2) above, U(x | ye) and ξ(x | ye) satisfy (21) and
(22) for x ∈ [x0,x 1]. One boundary condition on (21) is U(x1 | ye)=Ue(x1). Because
CRM1 is constrained by the inequalities U(x− | ye) ≥ u(α,1) and Y (x− | ye) ≥ 0,
each of which may hold with inequality or equality and each with zero or non-zero
shadow values (ξ(x− | ye) ≤ 0,µ(x− | ye) ≤ 0), the second boundary condition
depends on which of the four inequalities hold as equalities. For any ye,o n eo rm o r e
of the following four cases apply:
(a) x0 = x− and ξ(x− | ye)=0 : In this case (21) applies on [x−,x 1] and the
second boundary condition is ξ(x− | ye)=0 .A l s o , Y (x | ye) > 0 and U(x | ye) >
u(α,1) for x>x −,s oXmin(ye) has measure zero.
(b) x0 = x− and U(x− | ye)=u(α,1): In this case, (21) applies on [x−,x 1]
with second boundary condition U(x− | ye)=u(α,1).A g a i n Y (x | ye) > 0 and
U(x | ye) >u (α,1) for x>x −,w i t hXmin(ye)={x−}.
(c) Y (x− | ye)=0and ξ(x− | ye)=0 : In this case, x0 ≥ x− is endogenous and
{U0(x),ξ
0(x)}x on [x0,x 1] is described by (21) with the second boundary condition
given by requirements that (U(x0 | ye),ξ(x0 | ye)) satisfy HY(U(x0 | ye),0,ψ,ξ(x0 |
ye),0,x 0)=0and that ξ(x0 | ye) be determined by the diﬀerential equation −ξx(x |
ye)=HU(U(x0 | ye),0,ψ,ξ(x | ye),µ,x). The latter has solution ξ(x0 | ye)=
F(x0)/uc(c∗(U(x0 | ye),0),1).A l s o ,U(x | ye)=U(x− | ye) for x ≤ x0,s oXmin(ye)=
® if and only if U(x− | ye) >u (α,1), and Xmin(ye)=[ x−,x 0] if and only if U(x−)=
u(α,1).
(d) Y (x− | ye)=0and U(x−)=u(α,1):I n t h i s c a s e , x0 ≥ x− is also
39endogenous and (21) applies on [x0,x 1] with the second boundary condition given by
requirements that (U(x0 | ye),ξ(x0 | ye)) satisfy U(x0 | ye)=u(α,1) and HY(U(x0 |
ye),0,ψ,ξ(x0 | ye),0,x 0)=0 .F r o m Y (x | ye)=0and U(x | ye)=U(x− | ye)=
u(α,1) for x ∈ [x−,x 0], it follows that Xmin(ye)=[ x−,x 0].
Denote the sets of ye-values for which CRM1 has a solution falling into case
j ∈ {a,b,c,d} above by Y(j) ≡ {ye| (21) has a solution in case j for given U(x1 | ye)}.
Because (21) is saddle-path stable, solutions are continuous in the boundary value
U(x1 | ye), and because the cases are deﬁned by equality conditions, the sets Y(j) are
closed.
For ye ∈ Y(a), ξ(x− | ye)=0implies the second boundary condition ξ
0(x−)=
0. By logic analogous to that in case (2) above, U0(x) exists for x ≤ x1 and is
the solution to (22) with boundary conditions that U0(x1) is given and ξ
0(x−)=0 .
Saddle-path stability and (19) then imply U0(x) < 0 for x ∈ [x−,x 1].
For ye ∈ Y(b), U(x− | ye)=u(α,1) implies the second boundary condition
U0(x−)=0 .A s a b o v e , U0(x) exists for x ≤ x1; in this case U0(x) is the solution
to (22) with boundary conditions that U0(x1) is given and U0(x−)=0 . Saddle-path
stability and (19) then imply U0(x) < 0 for x ∈ (x−,x 1].
For ye ∈ Y(c),e i t h e rx0 = x−, which implies ye ∈ Y(a) so all results for Y(a)
apply, or x0 = x0(ye) >x −. In the latter case, it is straightforward to show that x0
is continuous in ye and that U(x | ye) and ξ(x | ye) are diﬀerentiable in ye on [x0,x 1].
Given diﬀerentiability, {U0(x),ξ
0(x)}x on [x0,x 1] is uniquely determined by (22) with




U0(x0) (which is the derivative of ξ(x0 | ye)=F(x0)/uc(c∗(U(x0 | ye),0),1)).S a d d l e -
path stability and (19) then imply U0(x) < 0 for x ∈ [x0,x 1], so U0(x0) < 0.T h i s
with U0(x)=U0(x−) < 0 for x ∈ [x−,x 0] implies U0(x) < 0 for x ∈ [x−,x 0].
For ye ∈ Y(d), one can show that x0 is continuous in ye and that U(x | ye) and
ξ(x | ye) are diﬀerentiable in ye on [x0,x 1]. Because U(x | ye)=u(α,1) for x ≤ x0,
40it follows that U0(x)=0for x ∈ [x−,x 0]. Then {U0(x),ξ
0(x)}x on [x0,x 1] is uniquely
determined by (22) with boundary conditions that U0(x1) is given and U0(x0)=0 .
Saddle-path stability and (19) then imply U0(x) < 0 for x ∈ (x0,x 1] and ξ
0(x) < 0
for x ∈ [x0,x 1].M o r e o v e r ,∂Y(x0 | ye)/∂ye =( −HYY)−1ωYξ
0(x0) < 0 implies that x0
increases strictly with ye.
Now consider the ordering of the sets Y(j), j =1 ,2,3,4. Because U0(x−) < 0
for ye ∈ Y(a) ∪ Y(c) and U(x− | ye)=u(α,1) for ye ∈ Y(b) ∪ Y(d),i tm u s tb e
that all points in Y(a) ∪ Y(c) are less than all points in Y(b) ∪ Y(d) except that
if both are nonempty, then Y(a) ∪ Y(c) and Y(b) ∪ Y(d) m e e ta tt h es i n g l ep o i n t
max{ye ∈ Y(a) ∪ Y(c)} =m i n {ye ∈ Y(b) ∪ Y(d)}. Moreover, ye ∈ Y(c)\Y(d) implies
U(x0 | ye) >u (α,1) and hence Xmin(ye)=®, which implies that Xmin(ye) has
positive measure only if ye ∈ Y(d). Because x0 is strictly increasing for ye ∈ Y(d),
it must be that all points in Y(b) are less than all points in Y(d) except that if
both are nonempty, then Y(b) and Y(d) m e e ta tt h es i n g l ep o i n tmax{ye ∈ Y(b)} =
min{ye ∈ Y(d)}.B e c a u s e ( i) Xmin(ye)=® for ye < max{ye ∈ Y(a) ∪ Y(c)},( ii)
Xmin(ye)={x−} for ye ∈ Y(b),a n d( iii) x0 is strictly increasing in ye on Y(d),i t
follows that Xmin(y1) ⊂ Xmin(y2) for any y1 ≤ y2.
Summarizing derivatives for x ∈ [x−,x 1]: Because (i) U0(x) < 0 for x ∈ [x−,x 1]
and any ye < max{ye ∈ Y(a) ∪ Y(c)},( ii) U0(x) < 0 for x ∈ (x−,x 1] and any
ye ∈ Y(b),a n d( iii) U0(x) < 0 for x ∈ (x0,x 1] and any ye ∈ Y(d), it follows for all ye
that U0(x) < 0 for x ∈ [x−,x 1]\Xmin(ye) and U(x | ye)=u(α,1) for x ∈ Xmin(ye).
Now consider any interval [min{y∗
e(xe)},max{y∗




e.L e t˜ U ≡ U(xe | max{y∗
e(xe)})=U(xe | min{y∗
e(xe)}) be xe’s
utility and let ˜ U = u(ye − Te,1 − ye/xe) implicitly deﬁne utility-compensating taxes
Te = ˜ T(ye).L e t{˜ U(x | ye)}x denote utility proﬁles that solve CRM conditional on
(ye, ˜ T(ye)). By construction, ˜ U(xe | ye)=˜ U for ye ∈ [min{y∗
e(xe)},max{y∗
e(xe)}],
so ∂ ˜ U(xe | ye)/∂ye =0 .F o rp r o ﬁles {˜ U(x | ye)}x, derivations analogous to those in
41(1)-(3) imply ∂ ˜ U(x | ye)/∂ye ≥ 0 for x>x e and ∂ ˜ U(x | ye)/∂ye ≤ 0 for x<x e. Note
that {˜ U(x | ye)}x = {U(x | ye)}x for ye ∈ y∗
e(xe). For any y1,y 2 ∈ y∗
e(xe) with y1 <y 2,
we have U(x | y2) − U(x | y1)=˜ U(x | y2) − ˜ U(x | y1)=
R y2
y1 ∂ ˜ U(x | ye)/∂yedye for
all x,s oU(xe | y2) − U(xe | y1)=0 , U(x | y2) − U(x | y1) ≥ 0 for x>x e,a n d
U(x | y2) − U(x | y1) ≤ 0 for x<x e. (The latter implies that Xmin(y1) ⊂ Xmin(y2)
also holds for any y1 ≤ y2 taken from multi-valued y∗
e(xe).)
To compute U(x | yH) − U(x | yL), integrate ∂U(x | ye)/∂ye over all subinter-
vals of [yL,y H] over which x∗
e is strictly increasing, integrate ∂ ˜ U(x | ye)/∂ye over all
subintervals of the form [min{y∗
e(xe)},max{y∗
e(xe)}] as in the preceding paragraph,
and sum. Because [yL,y H] contains at least one non-degenerate subinterval over
which x∗
e is strictly increasing, we have U(x | yH) − U(x | yL) > 0 for x ≥ xH,
U(x | yH) − U(x | yL)=0for x ∈ Xmin(yL),a n dU(x | yH) − U(x | yL) < 0 for
x ∈ [x−,x 1]\Xmin(yL).
Because U(x | yH) − U(x | yL) is continuous in x, the mean-value theorem
ensures that there is at least one crossing point x× ∈ (xL,x H) with U(x | yH)−U(x |
yL)=0 . The uniqueness of x× in [xL,x H] follows from agent monotonicity.
Proposition 5 Voting decisions of individuals with x/ ∈ Xmin(yL) follow from propo-
sition 4 (parts 1-3). (Because yH > 0, proposition 3 implies yL <y H.)
If Xmin(yL) has zero measure or if all x ∈ Xmin(yL) vote for xL,t h e nU(xM |
yL) >U (xM | yH) implies that x× <x M,a l lv o t e r si n(xM,x +] prefer xL over xH,
and (xM,x +] is a majority. The reverse applies if U(xM | yL) <U(xM | yH).
If Xmin(yL) has positive measure and all x ∈ Xmin(yL) abstain, let xm denote
the median of [x−,x +]\Xmin(yL).T h e nU(xm | yL) >U (xm | yH) implies x× <x m,
so all voters in (xm,x +] prefer xL over xH, and this is a majority. The reverse applies
if U(xm | yL) <U(xm | yH).
42Proposition 6 Immediate from proposition 5 (parts 1 and 2a). Whenever xM is a
candidate, x× 6= xM rules out a tie.
Proposition 7 From (5), T∗(Y (x)) = T(U(x),Y(x),x) determines T∗ for all y ∈
[Y (x−),Y(x+)].T h ec o n t i n u i t yo fU, Y ,a n dT implies continuity of T∗.F r o mC O N ,
Y has a piecewise continuous derivative ψ,s odT ∗(Y (x))/dy · ψ(x)=TU(U,Y,x) ·
dU/dx+ TY(U,Y,x)·ψ(x)+Tx except at points x where ψ is discontinuous. From (3)
and (5), TU(U,Y,x)·dU/dx+Tx = −c∗
U ·ω(U,Y,x)+c∗
n ·Y/x2 =( −1/uc) ·ulY/x2 +
(ul/uc) · Y/x2 =0 ,s odT ∗(Y (x))/dy · ψ(x)=TY(U,Y,x) · ψ(x).
From NB, Y −1exists for all y ∈ [Y (x−),Y(x+)] except possibly y =0and
y = ye.M o r e o v e r , ψ(Y −1(y)) > 0 wherever Y −1 is deﬁned, and ψ is continu-
ous, so dT∗(Y (x))/dy = TY(U,Y,x)=τ(x) and hence dT∗(y)/dy = TY(U,Y,x)=
τ(Y −1(y)). For any yd ∈ [Y (x−),Y(x+)]\{0,y e} at which ψ(Y −1(yd)) is discontinu-
ous, dT∗(y)/dy = τ(Y −1(y)) in a neighborhood of yd (excluding yd),s odT∗(yd)/dy =
limy→yddT ∗(y)/dy = τ(Y −1(yd)) is well-deﬁned. Thus (11) holds for all y ∈ [Y (x−),
Y (x+)]\{0,y e}.I f 0 ∈ [Y (x−),Y(x+)],t h e ndT∗(0)/dy ≡ limy→0dT∗(y)/dy =
τ(maxX0) is well-deﬁned. Therefore T∗ is continuously diﬀerentiable on [Y (x−),Y(x+)]
\{ye}.( B e c a u s eY −1(0) is undeﬁned if X0 is an interval, (11) may not hold at y =0 .)
1. On [x1,x 2], τ(x)=τ(x|ye,T e), which is strictly increasing in x from agent
monotonicity. Thus τ(x2) >τ (x1). The one-sided limits follow from the continuity
of dT∗(y)/dy = τ(Y −1(y)) for y<y e in a neighborhood of ye and y>y e in a
neighborhood of ye.
2. Monotonicity of Y implies Y (x) ≥ ye. Because (ye,T e) ∈ B by proposition
2, part 1b of proposition 1 requires that {U(x),Y(x)}x solve CRM2 on [xe,x +] and





uc(c∗(U(z),Y(z)/z),1 − Y (z)/z)
dF(z)+ξ(2)(x+),( 2 3 )
where η(x,z) ≡ exp{
R z
x ωU(U(˜ z),Y(˜ z), ˜ z)d˜ z} > 0. The transversality condition for
43CRM2 is ξ(2)(x+)=0 , which implies ξ(2)(x) < 0 on [xe,x +).I n( 8 )f o rC R M 2 ,N B
implies µx(x)=0for x ≥ x2,s oτ(x)=1−
ul
ucx = −[ωY(U,Y,x)/f(x)]ξ(2)(x). It is
straightforward to show that agent monotonicity implies ωY > 0.B e c a u s ef>0 and
ξ(2)(x) < 0, it follows that τ(x) > 0 on [x2,x +), and because ξ(2)(x+)=0 , it follows
that τ(x+)=0if x+ < ∞.





uc(c∗(U(z),Y(z)/z),1 − Y (z)/z)
dF(z)+ξ(1)(x−). (24)
Because (1) holds if and only if U(x−) ≥ u(α,1), transversality conditions for CRM1
are [U(x−)−u(α,1)]·ξ(1)(x−)=0and ξ(1)(x−) ≤ 0.B e c a u s eη/uc > 0, ξ(1) is strictly
increasing. Thus there are three possibilities: ξ(1) < 0 for all x<x 1; ξ(1) switches
sign from negative to positive at a point xτ ∈ (x−,x 1) where ξ(1)(xτ)=0 ;o rξ(1) ≥ 0
for all x<x 1. As above, (8) and NB imply that ξ(1)(x) and τ(x) have opposite signs
on [x0,x 1].I fξ(1) < 0 for x<x 1 then τ(x) > 0 on [x0,x 1) so T∗ is strictly increasing;
this is case (c). If ξ(1)(xτ)=0for some xτ ∈ (x−,x 1),t h es h a p eo fT∗ depends on xτ
and x0.I fxτ >x 0, (8) and NB imply τ(xτ)=0 , τ(x) > 0 on (x0,x τ),a n dτ(x) < 0
on (xτ,x 1); this is the inverted U-shaped case (b). Finally, if xτ <x 0 or if ξ(1) ≥ 0
for x<x 1,( 8 )a n dN Bi m p l yτ(x) < 0 on [x0,x 1),s oT∗ is strictly increasing; this is
case (a). If (1) does not bind (ξ(1)(x−)=0 )then (24) implies ξ(1) > 0 on (x−,x 1].
Proposition 8 The Euler equations for URM imply that the costate variable asso-
ciated with ˆ U,d e n o t e dˆ ξ,s a t i s ﬁes (23) for all x. Because η/uc > 0 and ˆ ξ(x+)=0 ,
it follows that ˆ ξ(x) < 0 for x<x +.B y ( 8 ) , ˆ τ(x) > 0 for x<x + and hence for
x ∈ [x−,x e] in the solution to URM. As {U(x),Y(x)} → {ˆ U(x), ˆ Y (x)}x,w eh a v e
τ(x) → ˆ τ(x) pointwise. Since [x−,x e] is compact, the convergence τ(x) → ˆ τ(x) > 0
is uniform on [x−,x e]. Hence there is a neighborhood of ( ˆ G(α),α) such that τ(x) > 0
for all [x−,x e].B e c a u s eτ(x) ≥ τ(xe) > 0 on [xe,x 2] and τ(x) > 0 for x2 ∈ [x2,x +),
it follows that τ(x) > 0 for x ∈ [x−,x +).
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